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KENTUCKY
LAW JoURNAL
VOLUME 86 1997-98 NUMBER 4
THE KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
Evidence
BY ROBERT G. LAWSON*
his Article discusses recent developments in evidence. It focuses
on specific issues, including statements for medical treatment or
diagnosis, tape recordings, "probativeness" versus "prejudice,"
and others.
I. STATEMENTS FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT OR DIAGNOSIS
A. Background
The law ofevidence has long included ahearsay exception for statements
made by patients to physicians. It was once limited to statements made to
"treating"physicians' (under an assumption that statements not motivated by
treatment were unreliable foruseas evidence). The Federal Rules of Evidence
codified the exception but expanded its coverage to include statements made
to "nontreating" physicians2 (for reasons totally unrelated to the reliability of
such statements3). The Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted the federal
*Alumni Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1960, Berea College;
J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky.
'See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Fannm, 53 S.W.2d 703,706 (Ky.
1932); North Am. Accident Ins. Co. v. Caskey's Adm'r, 4 S.W.2d 383,384 (Ky.
1928).
2 The "nontreating" physician is one to whom statements are made for some
purpose other than treatment, "usually readying the physician to provide testimony
on behalf of the declarant." ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW
HANDBOOK 440 (3d ed. 1993).
3 See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not
within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only
for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While these statements were not
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exception inDrumm v. Commonwealth 4 and then codified that decision when
it adopted the Kentucky Rules of Evidence ("K.R.E."). The exception is
defined as "[s]tatements made for purposes ofmedical treatment or diagnosis
and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis."
Doubt concerning the applicability of the exception has been prevalent since
Drumm, solely because of the expansion of the exception to cover statements
made to "nontreating" physicians. The supreme court has revisited the issue
on multiple occasions, most recently inthe case of Miller v. Commonwealth.6
B. Miller v. Commonwealth
In Miller, the defendant was chargedwith sexually abusing a six-year-old
child who lived in his apartment complex. The specific accusations were that
the defendant took the child into his apartment, threatened herwith a gun, and
sexually molested her. Some time after these alleged events, upon referral by
a family doctor, the child was examined by a physician from a children's
hospital. During this examination, the child told the physician about sexual
acts committed upon her by the defendant.
When called as a witness against the defendant, the physician was asked
to describe the purpose of her examination of the child.
Dr. Sugarman first stated that the child had come to her for "evaluation
of sexual abuse," but, upon questioning by the Commonwealth, explained
that her purpose in seeing the girl was to "treat" her. However, the doctor
testified that she had seen the child only once... for a total of one hour, and
had neither prescribed medication nor given the girl any counseling.7
The physician was then permitted, over defense objection, to testify that the
child had described various sexual acts committed upon her by the defendant.
The child also testified, generally confirming the accusations against the
defendant while givingwhat the supreme court described as "vague testimony
... in response to leading questions. '8 After his conviction, the defendant
admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis
of his opinion, including statements of this kind. The distinction thus called
for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects
the limitation.
56 F.R.D. 183, 306 (1972).
4 Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Ky. 1990).
'KY. R. EVID. [hereinafter K.R.E.] 803(4); see FED. P. EVID. 803(4).
6 Miller v. Commonwealth, 925 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1996).
7Id. at 450-51.
8Id. at 451.
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appealed on the ground that the physician's testimony was .erroneously
admitted in violation of the hearsay rule. Using Drumm as its yardstick, the
supreme court agreed with the defendant and reversed the convictions.9
C. Drumm and Sharp
Drumm involved the prosecution of a father for the rape and sodomy of
his two young children (ages three and six)."0 Statements relevant to the
charges had been made by the children to two psychologists and apsychiatrist
who had been involved in their care and treatment and in the investigation of
charges againstthe defendant. The supreme court abandonedits priorposition
that statements to physicians were admissible only if made for purposes of
obtaining treatment and adopted in its place a position that it described as
follows:
In the event of a retrial in the present case, we direct the trial court to
decide the hearsay question regarding each of the various out-of-court
statements by the children to the psychiatrist andthe psychologist by making
ajudgment as to whether "prejudicial effect outweighs... probative value,"
taking into account that when such statements are not made for the purpose
oftreatment they have "less inherentreliability than evidence admitted under
the traditional common-law standard underlying the physician treatment
rule."
This rule, said the court, "blurs the distinction between treating and testifying
physicians [but] does not completely abolish it."12 A somewhat clearerpicture
ofthis "blurred distinction" emerged three years laterwhen the courtrendered
its decision in Sharp v. Commonwealth.13
In that case, like Drumm, the hearsay consisted of statements made by
children to a psychiatrist about alleged sexual acts by the defendant. 4 The
court describedthe circumstances underwhichthe examination that produced
the statements was conducted:
Dr. Hilton indicated generally that he saw the children to evaluate,
diagnose, and treat them, but from the substance of his testimony, it is clear
9 See id.
'oSee Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990).
"Id. at 385.
12 Id. at 384.
" Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1993).
14 See id. at 543.
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that he was not a treating physician as that term is normally understood. He
was hired by Social Services for the purpose of evaluation, and any
treatment recommendation he made was incidental to his primary duty. 5
The court then indicated more clearly than before that the "blurred
distinction" ofDrumm had, in effect, createdtwo separate hearsay exceptions:
one for statements to treating physicians (admissible ifpertinent to treatment
or diagnosis) and one for statements to nontreating physicians (admissible if
"from the totality of the circumstances the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect.") 16 The court acknowledged that its
seemingly simple approach had proved to be anything but simple - "we are
thus required to revisit one of the most vexatious questions of law to come
before this Court in the last decade."' 7 (This reference was to the exception
for statements to nontreating physicians, especially by children alleging
sexual abuse by defendants.)
D. The Ambiguity of Drumm
Trial judges are regularly required to balance probativeness against
prejudice in determining the admissibility of evidence. 8 While this task is
relatively routine inmost instances, it has proven troublesome underDrumm,
mostly because of uncertainty concerning the meaning of the "prejudice"
component of the formula. Evidence is usually viewed as "prejudicial" if it
has the capacity to arouse an emotional response in decision-makers (e.g.,
graphic photographs of a murder victim) or if it has "an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis"'9 (e.g., a prior conviction for murder
in a murder case).
As a class of evidence, statements to nontreating physicians are not likely
to arouse passion in triers of fact, and they have no obvious tendencies to
suggest decision on an improper basis (unless they are totally lacking in
probativeness). Drumm assumes that the evidence has "prejudice" that can be
weighed against its "probative value," but sheds no light at all on the precise
nature of this prejudice nor on the means by which the prejudice works its
harmful effects. Except for one unexplained statement suggesting that the
15 Id.
16Id. at 544.
17Id. at 543.
8 An objection on grounds of unfair prejudice may be made against any kind
of evidence under K.R.E. 403 and its federal counterpart.
19 FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Committee's Note.
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prejudice results from"the aura which attends suchtestimony" 20 (presumably
because the witness is a physician21), the supreme court has shed no light on
the subject since Drumm, unless enlightenment on the subject can be found
in Miller.
E. Back to Miller
Miller's most notable achievement may be the clear obligation imposed
on trial judges to make an authentic determination of the status of the
physician offering the hearsay into evidence. The physician in Miller
prescribedno medication, performedno counseling, and saw the "patient" but
once for a period of one hour about four weeks after the alleged events
occurred.? She was "'not a treating physician as that term is normally
understood' 23 and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. The benefits
of the more liberal rule of admission for statements made to treating
physicians cannot be obtained simply by having the physician testify that
he/she was consulted for treatment (when circumstances suggest other-
wise).
Miller contains observations about both components of Drumm's
prejudice-versus-probativeness equation. The Miller opinion implies that the
probative value of statements made to nontreating physicians should be
viewed as suspect, unless physical findings from the examination correlate to
the alleged abuse. More importantly perhaps, the opinion indicates that in
judging the potential for prejudice from such statements, the strength or
weakness of the prosecution's case (without the hearsay) is an important
consideration. Therefore, the Miller court concluded that because the
prosecution's case was "exceptionally weak," the testimony of the physician,
"which had the undeniable effect of bolstering the child's testimony, was
severely prejudicial."24
20 Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Ky. 1993).
21 An "aura of infallibility" is sometimes given as the reason for excluding
expert testimony on scientific subjects. The concern is that jurors will be overly
influenced by the credentials of the witness and attribute greater weight to the
evidence than it deserves. It is difficult to see this factor at work in Drumm, since
the physician merely testifies to what the declarant said out of court about an
ordinary (nonscientific) event.
n See Miller v. Commonwealth, 925 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Ky. 1996).
2 Id. (quoting Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Ky. 1993)).
24 Id. at 451.
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F. Conclusion
Miller provides little help on the problem that the supreme court has
described as "most vexatious" - the admissibility of statements made to
nontreating physicians by apparent victims of child abuse. The "medical"
procedures from which these statements arise are almost always intertwined
with criminal investigations. They are thus deprived of the guarantee of
trustworthiness that exists when treatment is the driving force. It is difficult
in the typical case to find significantly greater indicia of reliability in these
statements than can be found in almost any out-of-court statement. Thus, use
of the "medical treatment or diagnosis" exception for admission of such
statements extends the rationale for the exception to its absolute limit, if not
beyond. Miller clearly indicates that the floodgates will not be opened for
hearsay of this type and for that reason alone it is a significant decision.
II. TAPE RECORDNGS - AUTHENTICATION AND HEARSAY
A. Brock v. Commonwealth'
Brock involved a murder prosecution and a claim of self-defense that
produced a factual dispute over whether the defendant or the victim had been
the aggressor in the deadly confrontation.26 The defendant proved an earlier
confrontation in which the victim had threatened future harm to the defen-
dant.27 He called the victim's mother as a witness to prove that the victim had
come to the fatal encounter after expressing an intent to kill the defendant; the
witness denied that the victim had expressed such an intent. When asked if
she had ever made a contrary statement in a telephone conversation with an
acquaintance, the witness claimed a lack of recollection.28
' Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1997).
26 See id. at 26. There were no eyewitnesses to the act of killing, although a
bystander was near enough to hear the sequence of gunfire from the two
participants. See id.
27 That confrontation occurred in the defendant's home three weeks before the
homicide. The victim had come there while intoxicated to accuse the defendant of
killing his dogs; he was armed with a shotgun. The defendant disarmed the victim
and gave the gun to a nephew who had come to defendant's home to restrain the
victim after a call from the defendant's wife. See id.
' See id.
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Defense counsel attempted to confront the witness with a tape recording
of a conversation in which she clearly stated that before going to the scene of
the homicide, her son had expressed an intent to kill the defendant. The
prosecution objected and the trial court refused to permit the defense to use
the recording. Defense counsel called the mother's acquaintance as a witness
to inquire about the taped telephone conversation. She testified to a lack of
recollection of the details of the conversation, but said that the recording
might refresh her recollection. The prosecution objected to its use for this
purpose and the court sustained the objection.29
Upon conviction for first degree manslaughter, the defendant appealed
on the ground that exclusion of the tape recording was reversible error. The
supreme court reversed the conviction?' In so doing, it rendered a clarifying
opinion on authentication oftape recordings and addressed some significant
issues concerning the hearsay use of out-of-court statements by witnesses.
B. Authentication of Tape Recordings
In this case, which is typical, the tape recording was offered into evidence
to prove the content of a conversation. With respect to authentication of such
evidence, Kentucky's case law points in opposite directions. In an early case,
the supreme court imposed rigorous foundation requirements on admis-
sibility. Among other things, it required showings that the recorder was
capable of recording communications and that it had been used by a
competent operator.3 1 In later cases, the court clearly accepted less auth-
entication of recorded evidence,32 although it never explicitly overruled the
earlier decision. As a result, lawyers argue over what the law requires and
29 See id.
30 see id.
31 See Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 362 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Ky. 1962).
[A] proper foundation for the admission of a recording would consist of(1)
a showing that the mechanical transcription device was capable of taking
testimony, (2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent to
operate the device, (3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of
the recording, (4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not
been made, (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the record,
(6) identification of the speakers, and (7) a showing that the testimony
elicited was freely and voluntarily made, without any kind of duress.
Id.32 See, e.g., Campbell v. Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 260,264-65 (Ky. 1990);
Poteet v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Ky. 1977).
1997-98]
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trial courts struggle with a very simple issue. Brock provides some clarifica-
tion.
InBrock, the Commonwealth arguedthat the tape recording had not been
adequately authenticated, relying onthe older authority described above. The
court acknowledged the apparent conflict in the cases, rejected the Common-
wealth's argument, and provided clearer guidance on the foundation needed
for tape recordings 3 The general standard for authentication, said the court,
is "evidence... sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims."'34 For tape recordings, such evidence is produced
when a competent witness identifies the voices on the tape recording and
testifies "that the recording is an accurate reproduction of their
conversation."'35
C. Out-of-Court Statements by Witnesses
The hearsay issues in Brockwere complex because the evidence needed
by the defendant (i.e., the victim's expression of an intent to kill the
defendant) was buried in three layers of hearsay-the tape recording itself, the
mother's statement on the recording, and the statement by the victim to his
mother. The deepest layer (the victim's statement) was easily found
admissible under the state-of-mind exception,36 and the top layer (the tape
recording) was ruled admissible under the past-recollection-recorded
exception.37 The middle layer (the mother's statement) was ruled admissible
31 See Brock, 947 S.W.2d at 29-30.34 Id. at30.
35 Td.
36 See K.R.E. 803(3). One of the common uses of the present state-of-mind
exception is to admit statements expressing intent to engage in an act to prove that
the declarant subsequently acted in accord with his or her intent. In this instance,
the statement would tend to support a fmding that the declarant (the victim) was the
initial aggressor in the deadly encounter. K.R.E. 803(3) would clearly apply to this
level of hearsay.
37 See K.R.E. 803(5). This exception applies to an out-of-court statement by a
witness who cannot testify about the matter described in the statement due to a loss
of memory. If made when the matter was fresh in the mind of the witness and
verified as accurate by that witness, the statement is admissible under K.R.E.
803(5) as "past recollection recorded." The court correctly concluded that this
exception could have been used to admit the tape recording if the trial court had
given the defendant a fair chance to show its prerequisites. See Brock, 947 S.W.2d
at 30.
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as a prior inconsistent statement ofa witness.38 Brock adds nothing to the law
on the state-of-mind exception but makes important, though minor, points
about the other exceptions.
The question of using "past recollection recorded" to admit a tape
recording into evidence had not been considered before Brock. The language
of K.R.E. 803(5) defines the exception as one applicable to a writing - i.e.,
"memorandum orrecordconcerning amatter about which awitness once had
knowledge. '39 Correctly noting that the exception could have been used to
admit a written memorandum of the telephone conversation into evidence
(assuming no recollection by the participants), the court stated, "Obviously,
a tape recording of the conversation would be an even more accurate record
of what was said." The court described as "persuasive" federal cases
applying the exception to tape recordings4' and held that the defense should
have been allowed to introduce the recording as "past recollection
recorded."42
The hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements of a witness is
defined in K.R.E. 801(A)(a)(1). It requires only that the declarant testify at
trial andbe subject to examination concerning the statement.43 The exception
is based on an assumption that the opponent of such hearsay can adequately
test the evidence through cross-examination of the witness. If the witness
claims a lack of recollection when confronted with the prior statement, there
arises reason to doubt the adequacy of the cross-examination. The witness in
Brock claimed loss of recollection concerning the making of the statement.'
The supreme court held the hearsay exception applicable nonetheless: "A
statement is inconsistent for purposes of K.R.E. 801A(a)(1) whether the
witness presently contradicts or denies the prior statement, or whether he
claims to be unable to remember it."5 Would the court have ruled similarly
if the witness had claimed a loss of recollection of the event described in the
38 See K.R.E. 801 (A)(a)(1). She testified at trial that her son had not expressed
intent to kill the defendant. See Brock, 947 S.W.2d at 28.
39 K.ILE. 803(5) (emphasis added). It also says that "the memorandum or record
may be read into evidence" if admissible, again implying that the exception is
applicable to writings that contain lost memory of a witness. Id. (emphasis added).
4 0 Brock, 947 S.W.2d at 30.
4' The court listed two cases it found to be persuasive: United States v. Kusek,
844 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1988), and United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.
1959). See Brock, 947 S.W.2d at 30.42 See Brock, 947 S.W.2d at 30.
41 See K.R.E. 801(A)(a)(1).
44See Brock, 947 S.W.2d at 28.
4 Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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prior statement? Such a claim would raise even greater doubt about the
adequacy of cross-examination of the witness than was raised by the facts of
Brock. In its opinion, the court cited approvingly a decision of the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky holding prior inconsistent statements admissible even
in this latter situation.' Whether or not the court would embrace this position
after more careful consideration of the issue remains to be seen.
11. 'PROBATVENESS" VERSUS "PREJUDICE"
A. Introduction
The most heavily used, and arguably most important, provision of the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence is K.R.E. 403. Itnotes that "[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."47 K.R.E. 403 is the law's general exclusionary rule. It
requires an exercise of discretion by trial judges and formulates an equation
under which that discretion is to be exercised. 8 Notwithstanding the
enormous importance ofthe provision and its federal counterpart,49 appellate
courts have provided only limited guidance on how to make determinations
under the equation. Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court departed
46 See id. The case cited by the court was Wise v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.2d
470 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). In that case, it is clear that the court of appeals intended
to limit admission of the out-of-court statement to situations in which there is
reason to believe that the claimed loss of recollection is fabricated. It gave the
following reason for its decision: "No person should have the power to obstruct the
truth-finding process of a trial and defeat a prosecution by saying, 'I don't
remember."' Id. at 472.47 K.R.E. 403.
48 The following judgments are required by the equation formulated in K.R.E.
403:
(i) assessment of the probative worth of the evidence whose exclusion is
sought; (ii) assessment of the probable impact of specified undesirable
consequences likely to flow from its admission (i.e., 'undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury .... undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence'); and (iii) a determination of whether
the product of the second judgment (harmful effects from admission)
exceeds the product of the first judgment (probative worth of the evidence).
LAWSON, supra note 2, at 56.
49 FED. R. EVID. 403.
[V OL. 86
EVIDENCE
from this practice recently when it rendered a decision in Old Chiefv. United
States." The case involved Rule 403's most important and most common
inquiry - whether evidence should be excluded because its "probativeness"
is outweighed by its "prejudice."
B. Old Chief v. United States
The defendant in Old Chief was prosecuted for possession of a firearm
after having been convicted of a felony. At trial there was a joinder of this
charge and charges of assault with a dangerous weapon and use of a firearm
to commit a crime of violence. In an attempt to foreclose the risk of prejudice
with respect to the latter charges, the defendant offered to stipulate that he had
a prior conviction for a felony offense." The stipulation would eliminate the
prosecution's need to prove a required element of the offense of possession
of a firearm by one previously convicted of a felony. As a result, the
defendant would also achieve his objective: to prevent the jury from hearing
that his prior conviction was for assault causing serious bodily injury.
The prosecution refused to accept the stipulation and claimed a right to
prove the required elements ofthe offense, including the name and nature of
the offense that resulted in the prior conviction. The trial court rejected the
defendant's offer of stipulation and permitted the prosecution to introduce
evidence showingthat the defendant hadpreviouslybeen convicted of assault
causing serious bodily injury. Thejuryretumed guilty verdicts on all counts.52
The defendant appealed, arguing that the probativeness ofthe evidence of his
prior conviction, when consideredin light ofhis stipulation, was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the other charges. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, concluding that the stipulation was not a relevant consideration
under Rule 403 and that the trial court had not abused its Rule 403
discretion.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed.M
C. Applying Rule 403's Equation
Old Chief is significant for what it says about the analytical method by
which to determine the "probativeness" of evidence when balancing
" Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
51 See id. at 646.
52 See id. at 648.
53 See id. at 649.
' See id.
1997-98]
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"probativeness" against "prejudice" under Rule 403. The Court considered
two possibilities - (1) viewing the evidence "as an island, with estimates of
its own probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole reference points
in deciding whether the... evidence ought to be excluded"55 or (2) viewing
the evidence in light of available evidentiary alternatives, with estimates of
its probative value being discounted when the offering party has "less risky
alternative proof going to the same point. 56 The Court found support forthe
latter alternative in the history of Rule 403 and concluded as follows:
[W]hat counts as the Rule 403 "probative value" of an item of evidence...
may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives .... Thus... when
Rule 403 confers discretion by providing that evidence "may" be excluded,
the discretionary judgment may be informed not only by assessing an
evidentiary item's twin tendencies ["probativeness" and "prejudice"], but by
placing the result of that assessment alongside similar assessments of
evidentiary alternatives.57
The alternative that the defendant offeredwas a stipulation that was described
by the Court as "not merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence ofthe
element 58 sought to be proved by the prejudicial evidence (i.e., defendant's
prior conviction). Consequently, "theriskofunfairprejudice did substantially
outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it
was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was
available."' 9
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Preserving Errors for Review
Motions in Limine: K.R.E. 103(d) provides that motions in limine (if
resolved by order of record) are "sufficient to preserve error for appellate
review."' In Tucker v. Commonwealth,61 the defendant moved in advance of
trial for exclusion of testimony concerning an uncharged offense and made
55Id. at 651.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 652.
581 Id. at 653.
59 Id. at 655 (emphasis added).60 K.R.E. 103(d).
61 Tucker v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1996).
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a general objection to the same testimony at the outset of trial. However, the
defendant didnot object on specific grounds when the testimony was offered
into evidence. 2 The Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that the defendant's
actions had not properly preserved error for appellate review:
An objection made prior to trial will not be treated in the appellate court
as raising any question for review which is not strictly within the scope of
the objection as made, both as to the matter objected to and as to the grounds
of the objection. It must appear that the question was fairly brought to the
attention of the trial court. ... While this Court has approved the use of
motion in limine as a means of obtaining pretrial rulings concerning the
admission and exclusion of evidence, we have not repealed the contempora-
neous objection rule. One claiming error may not rely on a broad ruling and
thereafter fail to object specifically to the matter complained of.63
There are two ways to interpret this statement and no easy way to choose
between the two. Does the court mean that motions in limine will not preserve
errors for review if based on "general" rather than "specific" objections? Or
does it mean that such motions will not preserve errors unless a con-
temporaneous objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial? The
second interpretation would seem to be plainly at odds with K.R.E. 103(d);64
the first would demand more of pretrial objections than is demanded of
objections at trial.6' Drafters of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence sought to
make it clear that motions in limine would preserve errors for appellate
review.' Whether or not this objective has been achieved may well depend
62 See id. at 183.
63 Id.
' "A motion in limine resolved by order of record is sufficient to preserve error
for appellate review." K.R.E. 103(d).
61 K.R.E. 103(a)(1) provides that grounds for objections to evidence need not
be given unless requested by the court.
66 In some jurisdictions the case law leaves doubt about the extent to which
motions in limine may be used to preserve errors for review. As a result
litigants are forced to renew objections or offers of proof at trial even
though brought to the attention of the judge and opposing counsel prior to
trial. Subdivision (d) [of Rule 103] eliminates this doubt by providing that
motions in limine resolved by order of record are sufficient to preserve
errors for appellate review.
EVIDENCE RULES STUDY COMMITTEE, KENTUCKYBARASSOCIATION, KENTUCKY
RULES OF EVIDENCE-FINAL DRAFT 5 (Nov. 1989).
1997-98]
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upon what the court meant when it said "we have not repealed the contempo-
raneous objection rule."67
Avowals: If evidence is excluded upon objection, preservation is
accomplished by entering the excludedtestimony into the record. K.R.E. 103
is ambiguous with respect to whether such testimony must be produced from
the lips of the witness or whether it can be produced through an avowal by
legal counsel.' It is more accurate and informative to produce the testimony
through interrogation of the witness outside the hearing of the jury, but more
efficient to permit counsel to state the substance ofthe excludedtestimony for
the record. In Partin v. Commonwealth,69 the supreme court eliminated the
ambiguity of K.R.E. 103 by choosing accuracy over efficiency:
A review of the record discloses that appellant did not request that an
examination be conducted outside the presence of the jury and offer the
testimony by avowal under RCr 9.52 .... Counsel's version of the evidence
is not enough. A reviewing court must have the words of the witness. As a
result, we find this issue has not been preserved. 0
B. Burden ofProof
Self-Defense: The Kentucky Penal Code employs a split burden ofproof
forthe defense of self-defense 71 (and other Penal Code "defenses"'). In order
to inject the issue of self-defense into the case, the defendant is required to
produce evidence sufficient to support a finding of self-defense. The
prosecution is required to bear the burden of persuasion (i.e., to prove the
67 Tucker, 916 S.W.2d at 183.
68 When evidence is excluded "the witness may make a specific offer of his
answer to the question." K.R.E. 103(a)(2) (emphasis added). This seems to
authorize, but not require, such a procedure. Moreover, the court "may direct the
making of an offer in question and answer form," which seems to imply that an
avowal by legal counsel is an acceptable way of perfecting the record for appeal.
K.R.E. 103(b).
69 Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996).70 Id. at 223.
71 SeeKY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafterK.R.S.] § 503.050 (Michie Supp. 1996)
(permitting the use of force in self-protection).
72 The Kentucky Penal Code has two types of defensive elements. One imposes
only a limited burden of proof on the defendant and is called a "defense." The
other imposes a full burden of proof on the defendant and is called an "excul-
patory element." See K.R.S. § 500.070 (Michie 1990); LAwSON, supra note 2, at
518-19.
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absence of self-defense just as it proves other elements of a crime). In other
words, the defense is like an element of a crime (to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt), except that the defendant must make it an element of the
case by producing supporting evidence.
A question that continues to arise under this law concerns the standard by
which to judge a defense motion for directed verdict of acquittal on grounds
of self-defense. If the defense is designed to function like an element of a
crime (except for the requirement that the accused raise the issue), a directed
verdict of acquittal should be granted unless "the totality of the evidence is
such... that reasonable minds might fairly find [an absence of self-defense]
beyond a reasonable doubt."'7 The supreme court has adopted neither that
approach nor this standard: "Although the Commonwealth has the burden of
proof, it does not have to rebut evidence of a defense. KRS 500.070(1). The
defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal, unless the defense
is conclusively established."74 If applied literally, the court's standard would
seem to resurrect the totally discredited "scintilla rule" and permit the
prosecution to defeat motions for directed verdict with any evidence tending
to negate self-defense claims, no matter how slight or unpersuasive it might
be. Whether or not the court really intended to erect such an imposing
obstacle to directed verdicts of acquittal on grounds of self-defense is
uncertain. Its language - "unless the defense is conclusively established?'- is
almost sure to be so construed in the lower courts.
Insanity: A problem similar to the one described above exists with
respect to the defense of insanity.75 It usually arises when the expert testimony
(prosecution as well as defense) in an insanity case overwhelmingly supports
the claim of insanity and leads to a motion for directed verdict of acquittal. In
dealing with such motions, the supreme court has used varying language to
describe the quantity ofproofneededbytheprosecutionto reachthejury. The
court has indicated in some cases that any evidence of sanity is sufficient for
ajury submission, 6 but in other cases, the state was held to a higher standard
" Hodges v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 811, 813-14 (Ky. 1971); see also
LAWSON, supra note 2, at 519-23.
74 Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky. 1997) (emphasis added);
see also West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. 1989).
75 See K.R.S. § 504.020. This defense is one of the Penal Code's very few true
affirmative defenses. A defendant must produce evidence to raise the issue of
insanity and in the end must persuade the triers of fact that he or she is insane.
76 See, e.g., Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Ky. 1982) ("any
evidence indicative of sanity"); Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 235,237
(Ky. 1979) ("any evidence indicative of his sanity"); Tunget v. Commonwealth,
198 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1947) (some evidence of sanity).
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of proof.' Confusion rather than clarification is likely to result from the
court's most recent description of its position:
This Court has long held that a motion for a directed verdict in a case
involving an insanity defense would be defeated as long as there was "some
evidence" indicating that the defendant was sane at the time of the commis-
sion of the crime.... More recently, we stated that "where there is any
evidence indicative of [a defendant's] sanity, there is presented an issue of
fact for ajury determination.".. .The testimony of Dr. Meyer and certain
lay witnesses satisfies this standard.... The standard we adhere to is
whether "[t]aking this evidence as a whole, it was not clearly unreasonable
for any juror to find the defendant was not insane at the time of the
incident""8
The scintilla rule ("any evidence") provides inadequate protection against
irrational decision-making by juries. The standard used in most situations to
keep juries within acceptable bounds requires that the trial court findroom for
reasonable men to differ. The supreme court has inched toward the adoption
of such a standard for use with the insanity defense' without abandoning the
contradictory notion that the jury must be permitted to resolve cases in which
there is "any evidence of sanity." As stated in an opinion dissenting from one
of the early "any evidence" rulings, when there "is no room for reasonable
men to differ... [t]he conclusion of insanity is compelled."80
C. Evidence ofLiability Insurance
In Wallace v. Leedhanachoke,81 a medical malpractice plaintiff sought to
prove that the defendant's expert witness was insured by the same pro-
fessional liability carrier that insured the defendant, contending that the
"SeePortv. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 327,330 (Ky. 1995) ("The appellate
standard... is whether it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find against
the defendant on the issue of insanity."); see also Ice v. Commonwealth, 667
S.W.2d 671,678 (Ky. 1984) (affirming submission to the jury because "[i]t would
not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find against the defendant on the issue of
insanity").
78 Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 246-47 (Ky. 1996) (quoting
Wiseman, 587 S.W.2d at 237 and Port, 906 S.W.2d at 331, respectively).
See supra text accompanying note 78; see also Port, 906 S.W.2d at 327.
8o Wiseman, 587 S.W.2d at 240 (Lukowsky, J., dissenting).
SI Wallace v. Leedhanachoke, 949 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
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evidence showed bias or prejudice of the witness in favor of the defendant.
The trial court excluded the evidence under K.R.E. 411, which forecloses the
use of evidence of liability insurance to prove negligence while leaving the
door open to the possible use of such evidence to show bias or prejudice of a
witness.82 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court had
not abused its discretion83 in ruling the evidence inadmissible:
The mere fact that the two physicians shared a common insurance
carrier - absent a more compelling degree of connection - does not clearly
evince bias by the expert, and its arguable relevance or probative value is
insufficient to outweigh the well-established rle as to the inadmissibility of
evidence as to the existence of insurance.8
D. Criminal Records
Background: In Commonwealth v. Willis,85 the supreme court held that
a certified copy of a Transportation Cabinet record of a defendant's driving
history could not be used to prove prior drunk driving convictions.86 In Hall
v. Commonwealth,87 the court heldthat a certified copy ofa state police record
of a defendant's criminal history could be used to prove his prior convictions
in the penalty phase of a felony prosecution.8 The court reasoned in Willis
that use of the record to prove the prior convictions was barred by the best
evidence rule;89 it reasoned in Hall that the best evidence rule was inappli-
2 See K.R.E. 411.
83 "We are not prepared to adopt aper se rule either permitting or prohibiting
this line of cross-examination. Instead, we adopt the balancing test discussed above
[i.e., "probative value" versus "prejudicial effect"] to allow trial courts to exercise
their broad discretion on a case-by-case basis." Wallace, 949 S.W.2d at 628.
SId.
85Commonwealth v. Willis, 719 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1986).
86 Statutes on drunk driving provide for substantially enhanced penalties upon
proof of prior drunk driving convictions. See, e.g., K.R.S. § 189A.010(4)(b), (c),
(d) (Michie 1997) (increasing the punishment for subsequent offenses).
87 Hall v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other
grounds by Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1996).
88 K.R.S. § 532.055(2)(a) (Michie 1990) provides that in the penalty phase of
abifurcated proceeding, the prosecution may introduce evidence showing the prior
criminal convictions of the defendant.
89 
"[T]he best evidence of the fact of conviction is the judgment setting out the
conviction.... [T]he notations in the Driving History Record are [not] a viable
alternative." Willis, 719 S.W.2d at 441.
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cable because the contents ofthe recordwere not in issue or controversy. This
reasoning was described in a strongly worded dissent as "seriously flawed"
and "artificially contrived."9
Recent Cases: In Robinson v. Commonwealth,9 the prosecution was
permitted (during the penalty phase ofthe trial) to prove the defendant's prior
convictions by introducing a computer printout from an out-of-state court
clerk's office. The record was a compilation of the defendant's criminal
history (convictions, sentences, charges, etc.), solicited by an investigating
detective and introducedthroughhis testimony.Y The supreme court ruledthe
evidence inadmissible notwithstanding the great similarity between this
situation and the one in Hall. The court spoke of concern about "any further
relaxation in the rules of evidence 93 with respect to this kind of evidence but
stopped short of overruling Hall:
While we are not yet ready to reverse course from that set by Hall...
in regard to the admissibility of Kentucky State Police printouts as intro-
duced by a member of that organization, we will not expand that holding to
embrace any compilation of data by any court or police agency in the
absence of exemplification, as required by KRS 422.040, or a witness who
can testify that the record comports with the business record exemption to
the hearsay rule.94
The court identified the authentication and hearsay problems inherent in this
kind of evidence. However, it saidnothing about the more significant obstacle
that is presented by the best evidence rule, thereby avoiding the need to
address the irreconcilable conflict between Willis and Hall.
In Commonwealth v. Duncan,' the prosecution attempted to prove the
offense of driving on a suspended license by introducing into evidence a
certified copy of the defendant's driving history from the Kentucky
Transportation Cabinet. The trial court excluded the evidence in a bench trial
and found the defendant not guilty when the prosecution offered no other
evidence of suspension.96 The supreme court granted a petition for
90 Hall, 817 S.W.2d at 231 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
9' Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1996).
92 See id. at 854.
93Id.
94Id.
95Commonwealth v. Dtincan, 939 S.W.2d 336 (Ky. 1997).
96 See id. at 336.
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certification of the law on the issue of whether or not the record should have
been admitted to prove the suspension. It considered the issue under the best
evidence rule, distinguished Willis, and declared the evidence admissible:
[I]f the Commonwealth is required to prove a previous conviction... (in
order to obtain enhanced penalties for the subsequent DUI conviction), the
"best evidence" of that conviction is a certified copy of the prior judgment
We believe the holding in Willis... is sound as to proving a prior conviction
under the facts presented therein.
However, in prosecuting a suspended license charge, it is not necessary
to prove a prior conviction. Rather, it is only necessary that the
Commonwealth prove that the individual was operating a vehicle while his
or her license was suspended... Thus, it is the license suspension, and not
a conviction, which is essential to establishment of the charge of operating
a motor vehicle on a suspended license.97
The distinction drawn by the court is sound, as is the ruling that the official
record accomplishing and documenting an act of license suspension is the
"best evidence" of that suspension.
Conclusion: Willis is the most important case inthis series, partlybecause
litigants confront the need to prove prior criminal convictions in a wide
variety of situations" and partly because the decision virtually eliminates the
risk of error in proof ofwhat is usually a crucial fact. Hall was a controversial
decision when rendered. It was incompatible with Willis and with the
fundamental rule of evidence that a party seeking to prove the contents of a
writing must produce the writing itself (absent a satisfactory explanation for
nonproduction). The recent cases, Robinson andDuncan, are consistent with
the ruling and rationale of Willis, but may be more significant for the
indication (especially inRobinson) thatHallwill not be expanded beyond the
narrow situation involved in that case.
97 Id. at 337.
" For example, a prior conviction may be needed as an element of an offense
(e.g., possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, persistent felony offender, etc.)
or to justify enhancement of penalties for subsequent offenses (e.g., trafficking in
controlled substances). And, of course, prior convictions may be needed (and are
admissible) to impeach the credibility of witnesses in both criminal and civil
litigation.
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